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Abstract 
The pacifist commitment contained in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has long been a 
source of scholarly interest and debate.  While the insertion of the clause in the post-WWII 
constitution was originally justified by General MacArthur (amongst others) as an expression 
of the ‘high ideals’ of liberalism and democracy that Japan was now embracing, it has since 
been derided as an impediment to effective Japanese participation in wars fought by the 
United States that are claimed to be in defence of freedom and democracy.  This reversal of 
liberal logic became evident in the early years of the Cold War as Japan was encouraged to 
support the US in the Korean War and has strengthened in the years since.  From the first 
Gulf War of 1991, up to the current War on Terror, much has been made of the constraints 
that Japan faces in supporting the ‘defence of freedom’ on a global scale.  This paper aims to 
show the place of liberal discourses in relation to the pacifist clause in order to highlight the 
great ambiguity and inconsistency that exists in liberal claims concerning the promotion of 
peace in international affairs.  In the context of tensions over Taiwan and North Korea, as 
well as the potential for controversial ‘humanitarian’ roles for the Japanese military in the 
South Pacific, these normative questions aim to shed light on the potential dangers of 
Japanese remilitarisation on liberal-internationalist grounds.  
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Introduction 
There is a common sense in liberal political theory and philosophy that universal 
adherence to liberal principles, on a domestic and international level, is the one 
potential path for the achievement of world peace.  This claim has taken many forms 
over the centuries since the Enlightenment, ranging from Kant’s ‘federalism of free 
states’3 to Michael Doyle’s democratic ‘zone of peace’4 and Francis Fukuyama’s 
‘post-historical societies.’5  Yet despite the various connections that have been drawn 
between liberalism and peace, the place of pacifism within liberal politics remains 
controversial.  The question tends to boil down to the extent to which liberal states 
should maintain and utilise military forces and the answers range from total 
prohibition, through transitional acceptance, to arguments in favour of the full-scale 
militarisation of liberal states. 
The case of post-World War Two Japan is instructive in this context, as it 
provides a clear example of the tensions and connections that exist between liberal 
ideology and militarisation.  The interplay between these issues is grounded in the 
debates over Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which formally declares Japan’s 
commitment to pacifism on what appear to be liberal terms.  In the years that have 
passed since the implementation of this constitution, however, there has been a very 
noticeable slippage from an absolute prohibition of militarisation, toward a much 
more permissive interpretation of Article 9.  At every point along the way, as this 
paper will demonstrate, the Japanese government has been prompted by the United 
States to rebuild its military capabilities, always in pursuit of liberal ends.  This then 
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raises the question as to why the pacifist clause was seen as the best way of promoting 
liberalism in the late 1940s, but has since been seen as a hindrance to the defence and 
promotion of liberalism on a global scale using military means. 
In order to get to the heart of this quandary, this paper will first examine the 
rationale for the insertion of the pacifist clause in the Japanese constitution.  It will 
then give an overview of the drift away from a strict interpretation of the pacifist 
clause during the Cold War.  Finally, it will examine the contemporary pressure being 
exerted both inside and outside Japan for a fundamental revision of the Constitution in 
order to allow the full remilitarisation of Japan in defence of liberty and justice on a 
global level.  At each step of the way the paper will show the presence of liberal 
argument, leading toward a conclusion that raises serious doubts about the theoretical 
connections between liberalism and international peace. 
The novelty of Japan’s pacifist constitution and its relation to various theories 
of international relations is well recognised.  Up to this point, however, most scholars 
have tended to focus on why the constitution is destined to be breached or changed
6
 
or, conversely, why Article 9 has proven to be so durable despite the warnings and 
doubts.
7
  These two positions basically fall along realist and liberal (or constructivist) 
lines respectively.  This paper, on the other hand, neither presumes the inevitable 
failure of the pacifist clause, nor celebrates it’s ongoing resilience.  Instead, it seeks to 
understand the role of liberal internationalist discourse in the erosion of Article 9 
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since its inception in 1946.  This provides a new angle for understanding the 
challenges and contradictions that beset liberal arguments concerning the possibility 
of world peace. 
 
After World War Two: Japan and the postwar liberal Constitution 
The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the subsequent 
declaration of surrender by the Japanese Emperor in August, 1945, was viewed by 
many around the world as a great victory for a liberal world order.  As the emergent 
United Nations – imbued with ideals of collective security, human rights, and self-
determination - began to take shape, a tremendous sense of optimism about the 
prospects for a peaceful future, guided by liberal principles, took hold in international 
politics.  Few people encapsulated this sense of moral progress more clearly than the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan, General Douglas MacArthur, 
who triumphantly declared in 1946 that: 
The struggle is now over – the cause of right and justice has prevailed. Christianity, 
democracy, and the essence of Western culture have survived – and the East is about to 
be opened to an enlightened age wherein its peoples progressively may attain that higher 
degree of human dignity which the war has been fought to preserve.
8
  
Building upon this sense of great human progress toward universal freedom, security 
and peace, MacArthur contended that: 
To the Pacific basin has come the vista of a new emancipated world. Today, freedom is 
on the offensive, democracy is on the march. Today, in Asia as well as in Europe, 
unshackled peoples are tasting the full sweetness of liberty, the relief from fear.
9
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These strong statements, incorporating clear references to the superiority of Western 
principles of government, set the tone for MacArthur’s subsequent involvement in the 
drafting of a new constitution for Japan.  Founded upon the need to spread 
enlightened principles to the ‘barbaric’ people of defeated Japan, the American input 
into the constitution was avowedly concerned with popular sovereignty, democracy, 
fundamental human rights and, most importantly, a commitment to the disarmament 
of Japan and the permanent renunciation of war.
10
  
 The impetus behind the pacifist clause of the constitution is itself clearly 
founded upon these liberal ideals. While many questions remain as to who first 
proposed the insertion of the article into the constitution, it seems that the main drive 
for it came from the American leadership in Japan.
11
  MacArthur’s own suggestion for 
the pacifist clause – in his infamous ‘note’ on the constitution – stated that Japan was 
henceforth to rely upon ‘the higher ideals which are now stirring in the world for its 
defence and protection.’12  While this version of Article 9 did not make it into the 
final draft of the constitution, it does suggest that the thinking behind the pacifist 
clause was not driven by strategic demands to keep Japan in a weakened and 
subordinate condition, but rather to give Japan a role in the new world order as an 
example for a peaceful future.  Nowehere was this aim stated more forcefully than in 
MacArthur’s 1946 speech to the Allied Council for Japan, in which he argued that the 
pacifist constitution:  
…points the way – the only way.  The United Nations Organisation, admirable as its purpose, 
great and noble as are its aims, can only survive to achieve that purpose and those aims if it 
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accomplishes as to all nations just what Japan proposes unilaterally to accomplish through this 
constitution – abolish war as a sovereign right.  Such a renunciation must be simultaneous and 
universal… Thereby may we further universal adherence to that higher law in the preservation 
of peace which finds full and unqualified approval in the enlightened conscience of the 
peoples of the earth.
13
  
This sentiment was backed by MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, Courtney Whitney, who 
suggested that the renunciation of war in the constitution would afford ‘Japan the 
opportunity to assume the moral leadership of the world in the movement towards 
lasting peace.’14  What is evident in all of these arguments is the centrality of 
universal, rational norms of state behaviour – ideas that can all be located within a 
liberal internationalist view of international order. 
 So it was that pacifism found its way into the Japanese constitution, firmly 
grounded in the triumphant liberal values of the post-World War Two era.  The 
preamble to the constitution of Japan sets the tone, with the statement that: 
We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the 
preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and 
intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the 
right to live in peace, free from fear and want. 
This is followed by the declaration that Japanese society shall ‘never again… be 
visited with the horrors of war through the action of government.’  Most important, of 
course, is the text of Article 9 which, in English translation, reads: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people 
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means 
of settling international disputes. 
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In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as 
other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized. 
The sense of permanence in Article 9 is clear to see.  There is no suggestion that war 
is renounced until such time as Japan becomes a fully functioning ‘normal’ state, nor 
are any other conditions attached to the clause.
15
 
Voices of concern over the exuberant idealism of the pacifist clause were 
certainly raised at the time, with one State Department memo calling the clause a 
‘startling and novel constitutional provision’ that might not ‘stand the test of time and 
the stress of relations between nations.’16  As stated in the introduction, this kind of 
argument has been at the centre of critiques of the pacifist clause since its inception.
17
  
For the purposes of this paper, however, the problem is not to understand how 
Japanese policies on war fell away from these liberal ideals and back into the amoral 
realm of power political concerns, but rather how the same liberal ideals that were 
invoked in support of the inclusion of the pacifist clause could so quickly and 
definitively be used for the opposite purpose: in support of the remilitarisation of 
Japan.  It was in the years immediately following the passing of the new constitution, 
in the context of the emergent Cold War conflict, that such pressures for the 
remilitarisation of Japan – in defence of liberty of democracy – came to the fore.  
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Japan and the Cold War: Drifting from pacifism 
It did not take long for the first cracks to appear in the Japanese commitment to 
pacifism.  Post-war negotiations, held by John Foster Dulles, Japan’s Prime Minister 
Yoshida Shigeru and General MacArthur in Tokyo in January, 1951, led to the 
signing of treaties between Japan and the Allied powers in San Francisco in 
September of the same year.  These treaties incorporated a formal declaration of the 
end of the war, as well as the settlement of issues relating particularly to 
compensation for prisoners of war, the administration of Japanese territories, the US 
security guarantee for Japan, and the status of US bases on Japanese soil. It is also 
interesting to note a short memorandum produced by the Japanese government dated 
3
rd
 February, 1951 – immediately following the Tokyo negotiations – entitled Initial 
Steps for Rearmament Program.
18
 This short statement, coming only five years after 
the Japanese constitution came into existence, clearly acknowledged that ‘it [would] 
be necessary for Japan to embark upon a program of rearmament’ in order to fulfil the 
terms of the security pact with the United States. To these ends, the proposal foresaw 
the expansion of the National Police Reserve as the ‘start of Japan’s new democratic 
armed forces.’19 
The conclusion of the peace and security treaties took place amidst the fierce 
fighting on the Korean peninsula, in a battle that many view as the first major military 
engagement of the Cold War.  The war in Korea brought about the rapid movement of 
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US troops from Japan to the peninsula, leaving a potential security vacuum that could 
only be filled by Japanese forces.  Thus, with the approval of President Truman, 
MacArthur – formerly the staunchest advocate of the pacifist constitution - ordered 
Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to form the National Police Reserve, which 
was initially composed of 75,000 police reserve personnel and an extra 8,000 coast 
guard personnel (the Maritime Safety Force), for the purpose of maintaining 
‘domestic order’.20 The establishment of the National Police Reserve and the 
deployment of the Maritime Safety Force following the outbreak of the Korean War 
may be seen as the first step in Japan’s remilitarisation. Indeed, this was recognised 
by the United States Army Colonel to SCAP, Frank Kowalski, who called the 
enlarged police reserve ‘the disguise of a new Japanese army.’21  What made it 
different, of course, was that it could now be recognised, both in the US and Japan, as 
a ‘democratic’ armed force, thereby negating the stigma that was attached to the 
Japanese Imperial Army less than a decade earlier. 
Despite the apparent disconnect between the pacifist aspirations of the 
constitution and the moves toward rearmament initiated by the peace treaty and the 
war in Korea, these developments were made coherent in the context of the divisive 
language that accompanied the Cold War, which left little room for pacifist neutrality 
on the part of Japan.  As President Truman put it: 
No matter how the immediate situation may develop, we must remember that the fighting 
in Korea is but one part of the tremendous struggle of our time – the struggle between 
freedom and Communist slavery. This struggle engages all our national life, all our 
institutions, and all our resources. For the effort of the evil forces of communism to reach 
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out and dominate the world confronts our Nation and our civilization with the greatest 
challenge in our history
22
. 
Communism, aided by China and Soviet Union, was, according to Truman, ‘a 
powerful and ruthless enemy,’ manifesting ‘the danger that arises from the plans of 
the Kremlin to conquer the civilized world.’  Most importantly, he argued that if the 
United States was not sufficiently prepared, the communist menace ‘would strike at 
Japan.’23  This view was reinforced in a statement by Dean Acheson, then US 
Secretary of State, who suggested that ‘Western Europe and the United States could 
not contain the Soviet Union and suppress German and Japan at the same time. Our 
best hope was to make these former enemies willing and strong supporters of a free-
world structure.’24 A memorandum from Acheson and George Marshall (who had 
served as Secretary of State prior to Acheson) to Truman on 8
th
 January, 1951, clearly 
illustrated American strategy in relation to Japan: 
The principal purpose in the proposed [peace] settlement is to secure the adherence of the 
Japanese nation to the free nations of the world and to assure that it will play its full part 
in resisting the further expansion of communist imperialism.
25
 
For the Truman administration, therefore, the threat of Communism was reason 
enough to support Japan’s remilitarisation, provided that Japan showed a commitment 
to liberal-democratic principles.  
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From 1952 onwards, the Japanese government received substantial ‘mutual 
security assistance’ from the United States, which was designed to solidify the 
security cooperation and integrate Japan into American military strategies through the 
supply of military facilities and provision of training programmes.
26
  This support 
enabled Yoshida to pass the Defence Agency Establishment Bill and the Self Defence 
Forces Bill through the Japanese Diet in March, 1954.  When the bills came into 
effect in May of the same year, three branches of the Self Defence Forces (SDF) - Air, 
Ground and Maritime - officially formed the new Japanese defence capability, with a 
total initial personnel figure of about 164,500.
27
  These developments were extended 
incrementally in the decades that followed.  The contested revision of the US-Japan 
Security Treaty in 1960, which remains the key statement of affairs up to the present 
day, saw a restatement of the commitment to ‘international peace and security’ at the 
core of the military arrangements between the two countries.  The 1978 Security 
Guidelines reinforced these arrangements
28
 and further attempts have been made from 
the 1980s onwards to ‘free up’ the Japanese military to take part in US-led actions in 
other parts of the world. At every step along the path, it has been largely left to 
activists within Japan to resist the process of remilitarisation, on the grounds that it 
could signal a breakdown of those high principles that MacArthur had spoken of in 
advocating the insertion of Article 9 in the post-war constitution.  From the US 
perspective – with the support of a succession of Japanese leaders – the moral 
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discourses of liberal internationalism, with a focus upon peace, democracy, and 
human rights, were placed at the centre of the re-militarisation process, as reasons for 
the rebuilding of the Japanese military. 
  
After the Cold War: Remilitarisation and constitutional change 
While the Cold War provided impetus for the gradual erosion of the pacifist 
commitment of Japan, anti-pacifist discourse reached a new level with the onset of the 
Gulf War in 1991.  It was at this point that Japan was accused of failing to ‘share the 
burden’ of preserving peace and security in the world and of using ‘checkbook 
diplomacy’ in dealing with the threat of Saddam Hussein.  If the post-Gulf War ‘new 
world order’ was to be embraced by Japan, it seemed that rearmament and material 
participation in wars of liberation and human rights-promotion would be the 
minimum required.  Then US Secretary of State James Baker put these arguments 
directly to the Japanese leadership in a speech in Tokyo in November, 1991.  Echoing 
the critical sentiments that had emerged over Japan’s lack of direct participation in the 
Gulf War, Baker argued that the time for ‘checkbook diplomacy’ was now over and 
claimed that: 
Japan’s foreign policy may now be headed toward the assumption of broader global 
responsibilities. As a major beneficiary of the global system, Japan must be a leader in the 
promotion and evolution of this system. This call for leadership should not just apply to the 
field of economics but also in building democracy, respect for human rights, stopping the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in facing transnational challenges in areas 
such as the environment, narcotics, and refugees.
29
 
Japanese reaction was swift, with a law being passed in 1992 that allows for the 
participation of Japanese SDF troops in UN-approved peacekeeping operations. As 
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with all of the post-1946 developments, this enlargement of the potential uses of the 
Japanese military was, once again, justified along liberal lines.  The forces were to be 
used exclusively for the ‘promotion of peace,’ allowing only ‘humanitarian, non-
combat, support activities in secure areas.’30  This perspective was captured in the 
1992 Japanese Diplomatic Bluebook, which claims that ‘Peace, in a true sense, should 
not simply mean an absence of conflicts. It must guarantee such values as freedom, 
democracy and human rights.’31  These definitional gymnastics, which refuse the 
equation of non-violence with peace, have persisted in the politics of the US-Japan 
relationship up the present day.  
The domestic and international pressure being placed upon the Japanese 
constitution has, if anything, increased in the context of the War on Terror.  In 
keeping with the aggressive promotion of liberalism that has marked the foreign 
policy of the Bush administration since the September 11 attacks, a re-armed and 
assertive Japan has also found favour amongst the neo-conservatives in Washington 
who have been so influential in recent years.  In a 2006 article entitled ‘A Japan that 
can say yes’, Dan Blumenthal and Gary Schmitt argue that a shared sense of ‘liberal 
nationalism’ between the US and Japan should be accompanied by heightened co-
operation in promoting liberal-democratic values – by force if necessary – around the 
world.  The authors applaud then Prime Minister Koizumi for equating ‘Japan’s well-
being with the spread of the universal values associated with liberal democracy and 
human rights’ and for introducing a development aid program that would reward the 
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‘recipient country’s progress in democratic reform.’32  They also express their support 
for moves to amend the constitution to remove the pacifist clause, arguing that a 
‘liberalism that wants to defend itself is no less liberal for doing so.’33  Such 
arguments have been taken up by William Kristol, who, in rejecting the need for UN 
approval in conducting US foreign policy, suggest that it would be better ‘to work 
with Japan, rather than kowtowing to China, on North Korea.’34  This more unilateral 
approach to the militarised promotion of liberal ideals represents a further departure 
from the PKO law that Japan passed in 1992.  To be sure, the Japanese government is 
some way from behaving in the way that the neo-conservatives suggest would be 
appropriate, but it is of great interest that liberal discourse has shown itself, in recent 
years, to be amenable to such proposals.   
An a more official level, the publication of a report on US-Japan relations by 
Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, entitled The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia 
Right Through 2020 (hereafter the Armitage Report), gives a good indication of US 
government thinking on Japan’s military future. The report, following on from a 
similar report published in 2000,
35
 identifies ‘radical Islamic fundamentalism’s attack 
on Western values [and] international extremism including terrorism’ as crucial issues 
for the new century.  The response, according the Armitage Report, is to continue to 
promote Western values such as democracy and free trade as the foundation for 
regional security.
36
 In this regard, the report offers India as an example insofar as it 
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‘has made the right choices in terms of democracy and openness, thereby providing 
greater domestic stability.’ Furthermore, ‘India’s successes in democratic practices 
add buoyancy to Japan’s own diplomatic weight founded on common values.’37 
Cooperation with other democratic states such as Australia,
38
 New Zealand and 
Singapore, based on these common democratic values is viewed as ‘the most effective 
way’ of promoting ‘free markets, continued prosperity based on the rule of law, and 
increasing political freedom’.39 
Emphasising the theme of ‘common values,’ the Armitage Report also 
establishes an antagonistic relationship between democratic states like the United 
States and Japan and the anti-democratic China. This ‘values gap’, it is argued  
‘matters in the most consequential form because it gives rise to a ‘trust deficit’’.40 The 
notion of a ‘trust deficit’ then leads to the argument that Chinese rearmament needs to 
be ‘hedged against’41 and that China is supporting ‘irresponsible’ states that are 
undermining the promotion of liberal principles on a global level.
42
  Japan’s role in 
relation to China is, therefore, to ‘illuminate a path for China to become a responsible 
stakeholder,’43 which ultimately means bringing about the democratisation of China.44 
In relation to military matters, while the report insists that the amendment of 
the constitution is a Japanese domestic issue, it also suggests that Japan should 
seriously address and even eliminate the constitutional restriction presented by Article 
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9.
45
  This suggestion makes sense in light of the clear implication that the United 
States, in partnership with its allies, may militarily intervene in the domestic affairs of 
states within the Asian region.  In an obvious reference to the idea of ‘conditional 
sovereignty’ that has been formalised in the ‘responsibility to protect’,46 the report 
promotes the development of: 
a region where leaders choose to address the internal and external problems arising from 
troubled states, like Burma, rather than turning a blind eye based on an outdated concept 
of ‘noninterference in internal affairs.’
47
 
In order to enhance the possibilities for Japanese participation in such actions, the 
report recommends the passing of legislation that would permanently enable the SDF 
to be deployed in humanitarian intervention or peacekeeping operations. This 
recommendation is based on the negative response to Japan’s creation of ad hoc laws 
such as the Emergency Law in 1999, the Anti-Terrorism Law in 2001 and the Iraq 
Humanitarian Law in 2003 that were used to legalise the despatch of its troops to East 
Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq respectively.
48
 According to the report, the process of 
making ad hoc legislation is unreliable, time-consuming and ineffective in times of 
international crisis.  
 These external pressures have certainly played a part in the ongoing debate 
within Japan over constitutional reform.  Under Prime Ministers Koizumi, Abe, and 
now Fukuda, the arguments over the ‘freeing up’ of the SDF from the limitations set 
by the constitution have not abated.  Shinzo Abe, in particular, was strongly 
committed to constitutional reform, and presided over the passage of legislation 
designed to enable such reform by 2010.  This, however, was one of his last acts as 
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Prime Minister, as a variety of domestic scandals, as well as the ongoing unpopularity 
of the renunciation of the pacifist clause, led to his downfall in 2007.  Indeed, one of 
the most fascinating aspects of recent Japanese history has been the strength of 
domestic resistance to the various proposals that have been put forward for 
constitutional amendment, as well as the opposition to the ad hoc legislation that has 
enabled SDF participation in recent war situations.  It is precisely the strength of this 
opinion, which was most recently measured at 66%,
49
 that has led to the current Prime 
Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, shelving the debate on reform for the foreseeable future.  
Nevertheless, as the political debate has continued, Japan’s military, as one 
journalist puts it, ‘has been rapidly crossing out items from its list of can’t do’s.’50  
Joint exercises with the US Air Force in Guam in July of 2007 involved the first live 
bombing exercise undertaken by the Japanese military since WWII and the operations 
in support of the US military in Afghanistan and Iraq continue, albeit in very limited 
ways.  The joint development of a missile defence system with the United States has 
also continued, leading to the expression of concerns by China that a new arms race 
may be developing, with Japan playing a key role.  Of even greater concern is the oft-
mentioned potential for the development of a nuclear arms potential by Japan, which 
would surely indicate a grave deterioration in relations in the region and increase the 
potential for an incredibly destructive conflict.  Set against the backdrop of concerns 
over Taiwan and North Korea and the ongoing possibility for Japanese participation 
in peacekeeping operations in the hotly-contested islands of the South Pacific, the 
idea of abandoning the pacifist constitution begins to look like common sense to 
some, but great folly to others. 
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The contemporary incompatibility of Liberalism and Pacifism  
What does all of this mean for liberal internationalist norms in the world today?  
While we must acknowledge that liberalism is not a single, coherent ideology, a 
number of problematic issues arise on questions of liberalism and pacifism when 
examined through the prism of post-WWII Japan.  Most prominent amongst these are 
the following assumptions: a) that liberal-democratic societies have an obligation to 
maintain and use military force in the service of international peace and security and 
that a pacifist stance runs counter to this obligation; b) that a state that has become 
liberal-democratic will never engage in aggressive or imperialistic foreign policy 
practices in the future and can therefore be trusted with large military capabilities; and 
c) that the definition of a ‘normal’ state incorporates an element of military power that 
can be used to transform international ‘institutions and norms according to Japanese 
values and interests.’51  I will briefly discuss each of these issues in turn. 
On the first point, it is clear that the increased pressures on Japan to militarise 
have always been characterised as an element of the responsibility of free nations, or 
liberal-democratic nations, to act against their enemies.  In the context of the Cold 
War this meant resisting the expansion of communism, while the post-Cold War years 
have been marked by the opposition to human rights-abusers and terrorists.  The 
remilitarisation of Japan, from this perspective, is encouraged in order to draw Japan 
from the sidelines of ‘history’ and into the heroic narrative of resistance and rescue 
that is particularly prevalent in cases of humanitarian intervention and the 
peacekeeping operations that follow.
52
  A pacifist insistence upon non-violence in 
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situations where ‘evil’ or ‘barbarism’ are manifest is considered selfish, cowardly, 
and unbecoming for a rich and free society like Japan.  Any understanding of a strong 
adherence to pacifist principles as being a brave form of action in itself, of setting an 
example for other states of the possibility of peace, appears to have disappeared in the 
years since General MacArthur spoke so eloquently in favour of the principles 
contained in Article 9. 
This discursive transformation has important consequences.  There have been 
a number of warnings in recent years over the slide of liberal internationalism toward 
liberal imperialism, by divergent scholars such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 
Robert Cooper, Tony Smith, and Vivien Jabri.
53
  As the War on Terror reached fever-
pitch with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the logic of liberal internationalism came to 
the fore in the justifications offered by Tony Blair and George Bush.  Indeed, the 
claim that the invasion and occupation was warranted as a humanitarian action that 
would free the Iraqi people from the brutality of Saddam Hussein and create a 
democratic model for the entire middle east proved to be the most durable argument 
in favour of the war.  The ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine that had been formulated 
in 2001 in the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention fed directly into this rhetoric, to 
the extent that many supporters of humanitarian intervention also spoke out in favour 
of the Iraq invasion.
54
  As we have seen, Japanese involvement in this conflict was 
limited and controversial, yet the case of Iraq illustrates the potential dangers 
presented by an over-zealous reliance upon militarised liberal internationalist 
principles.  A reconsideration of pacifism as a viable option for liberal-democratic 
                                                 
53
 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000); 
Robert Cooper, ‘Imperial Liberalism’, The National Interest, no.79 (2005): 25-34; Tony Smith, A Pact 
with the Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise 
(New York: Routledge, 2007);  Vivienne Jabri, War and the Transformation of Global Politics, (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 
54
 The most prominent example of this phenomenon was Michael Ignatieff, who later retracted his 
support for the war.  
 20 
societies is one possible response to these concerns, and Japan is obviously well 
placed to make an example of itself in that regard.     
The second point of concern relates to the calm assurance exhibited by many 
scholars and political leaders when considering the possibility that a re-armed Japan 
could pose serious dangers.  Any fears that the acceptance of a larger Japanese role in 
global military affairs might be a dangerous development appears to be limited to 
pacifist activists within Japan, as well as the governments of China and North and 
South Korea.  In the United States, as in other Western nations, a strong acceptance 
now exists that Japan has shown itself to be a reliable liberal-democratic nation since 
WWII and could therefore be trusted with an expanded military role.  As one 
commentator put it: 
Logic dictates that Japan play a greater role in global politics and security. There is no more 
reason to fear such a role for Japan than for Germany, another of the Allies' World War II 
enemies. Both are now democracies committed to peaceful resolution of international 
disputes. Neither is apt to use military force to grab another country's resources.
55
 
Such an argument has also been put forward by Alan Dupont, who suggests that ‘the 
existence of a resilient, mature democracy works against a revival of militarism’ and 
that domestic and international pressures are too great to allow a return to Japanese 
nationalism and imperialism.
56
  While this may be true in the short term, this kind of 
teleological argument, which sees Japanese development as being on a clear and 
irreversible path from nationalist imperialism to enlightened democracy, informs 
much of the anti-pacifist sentiment that emanates from Western governments, 
academia, and media.  
 This is not, however, an argument that can be taken for granted.  Even a 
cursory study of Japanese history will show that it was the Japanese attempt (and 
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failure) to gain recognition as an equal and just player in the European international 
order in the late nineteenth century that led directly toward the imperialism and 
nationalism of the twentieth.
57
  If Japan does indeed abandon the constitutional 
prohibition on war-making and redevelop a powerful – perhaps nuclear – military 
capacity, then there would be great cause for concern.  If we add in the fact that Japan 
has taken on board the idea that liberal-democratic countries need to strongly 
represent the ideals of ‘civilisation’, in opposition to the backward and abusive 
governments in China, North Korea, and perhaps even Russia,
58
 then we have a 
volatile mix of militarisation and ideology in a region that is not short of serious 
flashpoints for future conflict.  Again, this should give pause to those who assume that 
a liberal-democratic country is in some way immune from the temptation to wage 
aggressive wars or those who believe that nationalism and imperialism cannot be 
resurrected in the context of a liberal democratic society.  In this context, the 
continued adherence to a pacifist constitution, no matter how minimal, could well 
produce the best outcomes in terms of peace and security for the region and for the 
world. 
The final point that seems worthy of further inquiry is the notion of 
‘normalisation’ as it has been applied to the remilitarisation of Japan.  As I have 
shown above, the idea that Japan should reform its pacifist constitution and rebuild a 
strong and assertive military force is often expressed as a necessary precondition for 
making Japan a ‘normal’ nation-state.  While we may expect such rhetoric to come 
from realist scholars of international relations, who have always been suspicious of  
the durability of the pacifist clause, it is slightly more surprising to hear the language 
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of ‘normalisation’ being used by liberals.  It is quite clear that Article 9, while perhaps 
an imposition on the Japanese people in 1946, has come to be cherished by a majority 
of the Japanese people and this has been reflected in recent opinion polling.
59
  If the 
formation of liberal nation-states around constitutions is the foundation-stone of a 
liberal world order, it is hard to understand how any liberal thinker would see fit to 
condemn the Japanese constitution as being outdated or contrary to the promotion of 
liberalism on a broader scale.  Such an approach seems to represent a classic case of 
getting ‘the cart before the horse’.  In the negotiations over the drafting of the 
constitution, MacArthur and his associates were very concerned about ensuring that a 
document would be produced that would reflect the ‘freely expressed will of the 
Japanese people.’60  Once that had been achieved, the desire to overturn it in the 
interests of ‘international peace and security’ began to work in the opposite direction, 
prompting calls for constitutional change that continue today. 
It is of course difficult to overcome the ‘security dilemma’ inherent in realist 
thought when it comes to understanding international politics.  There is little doubt 
that Japan will be faced with military threats at some point in the future and it may 
well be true that Japan has only maintained its own security since WWII through the 
military protection offered by the United States.  But if we take Immanuel Kant’s 
work seriously, we should at least consider the possibility that disarmament and the 
renunciation of war as a sovereign right is a necessary precondition to the 
achievement of a sustainable world peace.
61
  If we are serious about pursuing the 
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peaceful ends that are promised in liberal internationalist theory, the acceptance (if 
not encouragement) of pacifist constitutions in liberal-democratic societies could well 
be a more productive path to follow than the insistence upon militarisation and 
physical domination of those considered to be the enemies of such an ideology.  
Supporting the maintenance of the pacifist constitution in Japan could, in this regard, 
set a fine example for other nation states as General MacArthur envisaged.  Rejecting 
the idea that an active military force is an aspirational norm of international political 
life constitutes a first step in reinforcing a sustainable discourse of peace that could, in 
time, undermine the paranoid arms racing that characterises the ‘real world’.  As Tom 
Plate wrote recently in the South China Morning Post: 
Underneath the swirl is the sense that the Japanese know they have achieved a lot by not 
being like other nations, by not going along the route of military build-up, and thus by not –
in this perverse sense – being quite the ‘normal’ nation.  Maybe they felt they were on to to 
something and weren’t quite ready to give it up.  If so, good for them.62 
This positive framing of the ‘different’ approach to security that has been taken by 
Japan offers a viable alternative to the insistence that constitutional change and further 
militarisation is essential in order to absorb Japan into the ‘normal’ community of 
nations. 
 
Conclusion 
The place of liberal theory in the formation and subsequent debates over the Japanese 
constitution is complex and often contradictory.  As this paper has demonstrated, the 
insertion of the pacifist clause was initially justified by MacArthur as being a 
foundation stone for a peaceful and democratic Japan and a guiding light for a 
peaceful future world order.  In the years that have followed, however, the same 
                                                 
62
 Tom Plate, ‘Japan – Not Quite the ‘Normal’ Nation’, The South China Morning Post, August 2 
(2007): 11. 
 24 
arguments have been used against the maintenance of Article 9, with the claim that a 
economically strong and liberal democratic Japan must assist in the preservation of 
world peace through military means.  The outcome has been that the more Japan has 
proved its liberal-democratic credentials, the more militarised it has become.  Any 
suggestion of pacifism as being a hallmark of a peaceful liberal-democratic world 
order has precipitiously fallen by the wayside in the years since 1946, to the extent 
that many commentators and political leaders now argue that Japanese remilitarisation 
should proceed precisely because it is a liberal-democratic country.  This appears in 
stark contrast to the initial arguments in support of the pacifist clause, which 
suggested that such a clause was necessary to preserve liberal-democratic institutions 
in Japan and to provide a shining example of the commitment to peace that a people 
could subscribe to in their national constitution. 
 The malleability of liberal thought in relation to a pacifist Japan has a number 
of important consequences for theories of international relations.  We seem to have 
entered a phase of liberal theory in which the pursuit of peace is locked in an 
unbreakable relation with the exercise of military force.  This trend is most evident in 
the justifications for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also lies at the heart of the 
popular ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine which has been used to promote and justify 
the use of force for humanitarian ends.  For Japan, these liberal arguments in support 
of militarisation have been used to push against the ongoing validity of Article 9 of 
the Japanese constitution, both domestically and internationally.  While such moves 
are yet to result in constitutional change, there have been incremental legislative 
changes that have progressively permitted increased military activity by the Japanese 
SDF in the years since 1946.  Indeed, we appear to have reached a point where the 
 25 
continued Japanese commitment to pacifist principles is now condemned as being 
antithetical to world peace. 
 These movements and pressures being exerted upon Japan for constitutional 
change that would allow full scale remilitarisation must, in our opinion, be subject to 
serious critical scrutiny, particularly when liberal arguments are being used in their 
favour.  In contrast to the suggestion that liberal-democracy must be defended 
militarily by Japan, we believe that there is a strong case to be made that the ongoing 
commitment to Article 9 offers a far greater prospect for producing peace in the Asian 
region (and perhaps even globally) and that the original reasoning offered by 
MacArthur for the insertion of that clause remains relevant in the contemporary 
context.  As a 2007 editorial in the International Herald Tribune (Herald Asahi) so 
eloquently argued:  
Japan should strive to become a ‘coordinator of the public interest’ and contribute to a 
peaceful present and future for humanity.  The limits of military power have become more 
than apparent.  We are confident that the philosophy of Article 9 can grant a new power to 
Japan.  We see no reason whatsoever to discard it.
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